Beyond trade facilitation, transparency norms in the WTO legal context are, implicitly and explicitly, aimed at addressing problems in the domestic administrative laws of its members. Through the lens of global governance, this article attempts to shed more light on the power of transparency norms enshrined in multilateral trading agreements under the aegis of the WTO. In this global ruled-based system, transparency has become sufficiently powerful to be a multifunctional instrument for promoting the rule of law, good governance, and democracy.
Introduction
Despite continuing debates about whether Western liberal democratic values explicitly conflict with Eastern culture in developing countries, Western transparency norms have recently become internationally and domestically accepted and are considered to be a key component of good governance and public policy in both public and private sectors. Christopher Hood and David Heald have labeled the recent emphasis on transparency "quasi-religious in nature."
1 Transparency is the sine qua non for democracy, a panacea for fighting corruption and bad governance. As with other "religious" manifestations, though, the nature and reach of transparency is not always clear. This article seeks to probe the sources, adoption, and likely impact of transparency norms.
Demands for greater transparency adhere inevitably to what many commentators agree is a fundamental human right: Freedom of Information (hereinafter, FOI). In Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly on December 10, 1948, 2 the international community collectively defined the basic rights of every individual worldwide as including:
the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.
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Professor Ann Florini has stated that Article 19 defined the link between the right to know and the right to speak. 4 A free press is useless without the freedom to be informed.
From a broader perspective, many scholars have argued that the right to access documents held by authorities needs to be globally recognized as a fundamental human right for several reasons, such as guaranteeing full participation in political activities 5 and assuring the functioning of democracy. 6 More specifically, Mark Bovens (2002) has emphasized that information rights should be considered as an element of citizenship, a part of constitutionally-regulated civil rights establishing a crucial step toward correcting existing problems of accountability.
Many scholars have highlighted the role of the WTO as a "policy-anchor." 9 In the WTO legal context, transparency norms, from Article X of the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 10 to Article X of the 1994 GATT, 11 have regularly been utilized by developed countries, whose strong economic power and reputations within the international community have then enabled them to impose their standardized policies on the WTO's legal system. 12 As a result, to be accepted as a new WTO member, developing and transition state members must accept and internalize these unfamiliar policies in order to meet the demands of global integration and economic promotion. In imposing such requirements, the WTO has clearly become a mechanism by which international norms originating in Western industrialized countries have been imposed; these are then adopted by weaker members with varying degrees of enthusiasm.
Together with other WTO principles, transparency norms were expected to significantly promote trade liberalization and establish transnational economic interdependence. It is becoming increasingly clear, however, that the impact of the WTO norms goes beyond the trade context. A growing number of empirical studies have examined other potential or actual impacts of WTO regulations and obligations on developing countries. For instance, the WTO could directly promote and disseminate values of good governance through its functioning and decision-making to help consolidate its institutional and regulatory capacities in developing countries. 13 Susan Ariel Aaronson and Abouharb have argued that while the WTO does not tend to explicitly affect the governance of its member states, group of states in negotiating processes and new state members all have moved toward a more transparent society by improving their policies on access to information.
14 In other words, WTO regulations and obligations have indirectly resulted in governmental change.
More specifically, some contemporary scholars have analyzed the impact of WTO accession on the promotion of democracy and legitimacy. Professor Padideh Ala'i has mentioned the role of WTO jurisprudence underpinning in Article X of GATT, which concerns transparency and due process in consolidating good governance both internationally and domestically. 15 Other scholars have stressed the positive impacts of transparency norms and other WTO actions on anticorruption efforts and democracy- org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_01_e.htm.
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The 1994 GATT adopted the provisions of the 1947 GATT, "as rectified, amended or modified by the terms of legal instruments which have entered into force before the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement", https://www.wto. org/english/docs_e/legal_e/06-gatt_e.htm. See also the Marrakesh Agreement, which resulted from the Uruguay Round and established the WTO and acknowledged the continuation of, and updates to, the GATT. Marrakesh Agreementbuilding in developing and transition countries. Some examples of these actions are the accession procedures, 16 the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), 17 and various implicit WTO agreements. 18 Obviously, analyzing the impact of norms on a given state must inevitably and initially be contextualized to local legislation and political orientation.
Significantly, the Doha Ministerial Declaration of 2001 defined transparency as one of three vital elements of trade liberalism. 19 Beyond trade, as asserted in the Report of the Consultative Board to Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi (Sutherland Report), transparency is key to addressing issues relating not only to the governance and legitimacy of the WTO itself, but also to those of their members due to the member-driven milieu.
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It is apparent that transparency policy in the WTO context has expanded beyond its focus on trade facilitation. This article will conduct a comprehensive study of the diverse aims of transparency norms in WTO jurisprudence to shed more light on the hypothesis that transparency in global trade institutions is more than just a tool for promoting trade liberalization. 28 Therefore, the unconditional acceptance of the contracting parties to the US proposal for the publication and administration of trade regulation can, in large, be attributed to pressure from US power.
Article X of GATT: The Transparency Principle for Building the Rule of Law
International consensus on these efforts was not only because of the hegemonic position of the US but also because of the perceived insignificance of the provision, as Ostry observes:
Article X in the GATT replicates most of the American approach. The word transparency does not appear but the article spells out in detail the rule for "publication and administration" of trade regulations with the latter emphasizing the desirability (rather than necessity) of independent tribunal and judicial review . . . [B] e that as it may, the inclusion of Article X on transparency at the time of GATT's origin appeared to be non-controversial to the drafters of the new system, because it mainly involved reporting tariff schedules. It was non-controversial because it was insignificant. Sylvia Ostry argues that there was no objection from any "contracting party" on the draft of Article X of GATT 1947, since they all thought that this was just a pro forma provision due to its lack of procedural or substantive force. See Sylvia Ostry, Article X and the concept of transparency in the GATT/WTO, in CHINA AND THE LONG MARCH TO In actual practice, the political doctrine of separation of powers embodied in the US Constitution and that underlay Article 10 was impossible to apply to GATT 1947 because it had neither any formal organizational status as a legislative body (because of the nonexistence of the ITO), nor did it consider any official procedures for dispute settlement by an independent judiciary. 30 Fortunately, the US government had successfully provided models for administrative procedure and international trade law, whereby "emphasis on transparency, fairness, and access to the courts has increased the accountability, fairness, efficiency, and acceptability of a wide range of government decision making." 31 As a result, despite the incompatibility of Article X with the underlying GATT structure, its adoption has played a significant role in shaping so-called global governance. 
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"A fundamental, constitutional guarantee that all legal proceedings will be fair and that one will be given notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard before the government acts to take away one's life, liberty, or property.
Van Tran, International Review of Law 2016:iit.2
The first paragraph of Article X prominently introduces the principle of publicity that is associated with the right to know, despite the fact that the text of Article X explicitly limits the scope of public disclosure to laws or regulations related to "customs purposes, or to rates of duty, taxes or other charges, or to requirements, restrictions or prohibitions on imports or exports or on the transfer of payments therefor
[sic], or affecting their sale, distribution, transportation, insurance, warehousing inspection, exhibition, processing, mixing or other use." 41 The term "transparency" is not even explicitly used, but the foundational features of transparency (publicity and disclosure) obviously impact domestic administrative law to some extent. Practically, to adapt to (or comply with) the requirements of Article X, states have to institutionalize or internalize transparency norms by enacting FOI laws or administrative procedure acts and the like. Interestingly, Article X directly creates horizontal transparency to protect the interests of traders and investors of its member states (trade facilitation), but also indirectly impacts legal reform in transition states in favor of upward and in/outward transparency, thus eventually contributing to the respect for human rights (the right to know).
In fact, Article X has regularly been invoked to address the individual right of access to information of "traders," "investors," or "importers" and the like. Of course, the WTO and its Appellate Body always perceive that they cannot and should not go beyond their mandate to address issues irrelevant to trade, such as human rights or democracy. However, the principle of publicity embedded in Article X indirectly affects the domestic legal systems by requiring respect for the right to know, or FOI.
Even though the relevance of human rights in Article X has never been directly referred to in WTO jurisprudence, many scholars have emphasized that there is growing awareness in the WTO that standards of accountability "potentially provide an independent source of legitimacy, derived not just from states, but directly from citizens." 42 WTO leaders believe that transparency is an indispensable condition for democratic accountability, and that by engaging in transparency, "good faith" will likely emerge. In this sense, the WTO attempts to promote input legitimacy not only in its decision-making process, but also through members' domestic law-making procedures. Hence, we can see a similarity in purpose between building public trust through the EU's transparency initiatives and promoting "good faith" through WTO transparency norms. We are of the view that for importers to become acquainted with the methodology for determining the MRSP, it is important for them to become familiar with, for instance, how the information they provide is processed. Also, they need to be informed on how Thai Excise determines the marketing costs where the information provided by importers is not accepted.
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In these two cases, the panel seized on the words and phrases "published promptly" and "to become acquainted" to obligate authorities or bureaucracies to account for what they have done. The principle of publicity therefore expanded not only from the publication of policy but also from accountability for how policies are made. Wolfe (2013) argues that transparency is a political environment through which citizens hold their governments accountable, and transparency today consists of three dimensions: predictability, simplification, and accountability. 45 Article X should thus be taken into account as a manifestation of these principles of the rule of law. Regarding the principle of an independent judiciary, Article X:3(b) and (c) unfortunately cannot impose compulsory regulations mandating independent tribunals and administrative reviews. Instead, Article X calls on each member state to institute judicial or administrative tribunals "as soon as practicable" to independently review administrative actions. This weakness could be attributed to inconsistency among the domestic legal infrastructures of state members. 49 Moreover, the WTO does not explicitly intend to interfere in the domestic polity of member states, including the procedural rules for institutional structures.
For example, in Thailand -Cigarettes (Philippines), the Panel tried to limit the scope of the application of prompt review mentioned in Article X:3(b) as follows:
[W]e are of the view that Article X:3(b) of the GATT 1994 requires a WTO Member to establish and maintain independent mechanisms for prompt review and correction of administrative action in the area of customs administration. However, neither text nor context nor the object and purpose of this Article require that the decisions emanating from such first instance review must govern the practice of all agencies entrusted with administrative enforcement throughout the territory of a particular WTO Member.
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As a result, the provisions of Article X:1, 2 can be deemed to be transparency obligations, whereas those of Article X:3 may be considered a set of recommendations rather than requirements for states. The
Appellate Body has attempted to find an amicable solution to this inconsistency by interpreting Article X through litigation. In EC -Selected Customs Matters (2006), the Panel pointed out that "in some WTO
Members, administrative action relating to customs matters may be reviewed by the same administrative authority," 51 but this kind of review is not allowed under Article X:3(b) of GATT 1994 due to the absence of independence. Thus, the Panel provided a definition of "independent review" as "free of control or influence from the administrative agencies whose decisions are the subject of review, [so as to act] with freedom in institutional and practical terms from interference by the agencies whose decisions are being reviewed." No mechanism was proposed for independent tribunals or administration under this interpretation.
In sum, the intention of Article X of GATT (both 1947 and 1994) was to provide compelling requirements (or suggestions) for enhancing the rule of law within WTO state Members. We can see that Article X of GATT was easily accepted by all contracting parties in Geneva for the following reasons:
(1) The insufficient legal force of Article X:3
(2) The many potential benefits of the rule of law promoted by Article X and transparency principles, including trade facilitation, democratization, and good governance, as noted by Carothers.
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Article X of GATT is not sui generis. Wolfe, Regulatory Transparency, supra note 9, at 170. 59 The intertwined nature of the relationship between Article 7 and Annex B has led prior panels and the Appellate Body to find that an inconsistency with the provisions of Annex B results in an inconsistency with Article 7, and that a failure to prove a violation of Annex B results in the same failure regarding Article 7.
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Similar to what has been discussed in the case of Article X of GATT regarding the "default" inconsistency in transparency requirements, Article 7, in conjunction with Annex B, involves the same type of conflict between soft law and quasi-hard law. Again, the WTO jurisprudence has attempted to reduce the legislative inconsistency through practical regulation. Then, a strong rule-based trading system may, in turn, support the domestic administrative law system with or without relating to trade. To demonstrate this hypothesis, this paper analyzes another inconsistency in notification requirements: the confusion between SPS measures (mentioned in Article 7) and regulations (Annex B-1), inasmuch as "regulations" cannot be used as a synonym for "measures" linguistically. In order to shed light on this confusion, in JapanAgricultural Product II (1998), the Panel attempted to clarify the publication and notification requirements as follows:
Therefore, in our view, for a measure to be subject to the publication requirement in Annex B, three conditions apply: (1) the measure "[has] been adopted"; the measure is a "phytosanitary regulation", namely a phytosanitary measure such as a law, decree or ordinance, which is (3) "applicable generally." 2:2, states must issue technical regulations that are not "more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective," including, but not limited to, the prevention of deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health; or the environment. 66 A corollary to this provision is that, beyond trade facilitation and the elimination of protectionism, the TBT Agreement, along with the SPS Agreement, has attempted to balance different interests in policymaking, so that technocratic input legitimacy will be enhanced. As noted by Cassese (2004):
The SPS Agreement seeks to reconcile free trade with the sanitary and phytosanitary measures necessary to protect human, animal, and plant health. The TBT Agreement seeks to balance the needs of international commerce with the safety of products and processes, because excessively and unjustifiably complex national rules governing products, processes, and methods of production might discriminate against foreign products.
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In many cases, the domestic infrastructure of Member states cannot meet the above requirements appropriately and comprehensively. International standards from good regulatory practice will be used as a "magnetic needle" for domestic regulation, thus cultivating harmonization by regulatory standardization as provided in Article 3 of the TBT Agreement. 68 Understanding that TBT-related policy differences and divergence have resulted in the gap in comparative advantages among nations, 69 the Committee on TBT agreed that transparency and public consultation are determinant mechanisms for international standardization contributed by all Members. 70 Through democratic participation, the input legitimacy of domestic regulatory regimes is likely to be consolidated. According to Mitchell's theory of administration legitimacy, central or local government entities of Member states, following Articles 2 and 3 of the TBT Agreement, must have the right to determine relevant regulations and must ensure that public tasks are handled according to principles of transparency, public consultation, and democratic accountability. 71 In this sense, the transparency principle embodied in notification obligations is aimed at improving the legitimacy of domestic administration.
Enquiry Points: Promoting Responsiveness and Accountability
According to Article 10 of the TBT Agreement and Annex B of the SPS Agreement, each Member shall establish one enquiry point through which all reasonable questions relating to the following will receive a response:
66 SPS Agreement, supra note 54. Member "shall ensure that one enquiry point exists" which is responsible for the provision of answers to all reasonable questions as well as the provision of relevant documents. 75 In essence, WTO transparency requirements embedded in enquiry points initiatives, to some extent, positively impact the legitimacy and democracy of Member states. In this relationship, developing countries will enjoy overall advantages: they have a right to be treated favorably, based on the provisions of special and differential treatment of developing Member states in the SPS, TBT, and other agreements, but can request technical assistance from developed Member states in building responsive regulation, including notification procedures, enquiry points, and the like. As Speer (2012) notes:
The most frequently cited reasons for promoting the implementation of participatory governance mechanisms in developing countries are that it improves public service delivery, that it empowers citizens and that it deepens democracy. More specifically, participatory governance is stated to increase local government responsiveness and accountability. 76 In thinking so, technical assistance 77 and the Code of good practice 78 in the TBT and SPS Agreements are tools of the developed world utilized as political-economic weapons to attack the circumstances of poor governance and the lack of responsiveness and accountability in developing countries. Naiki (2009) argues that SPS and TBT-related regulations provide an accountability mechanism for facilitating interactions (cooperation or coordination) among States and promoting transparency, responsiveness, legitimacy, and accountability, commonly known as democratic values.
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With regard to these democratic qualities, the WTO Committee on SPS defined public participation as information exchange in regular biennial meetings, in which representatives of interested observers participate and discuss technical issues. 80 In spite of leaving any policy-related consideration to the Committee itself, a person responsible for enquiry points still has opportunities to respond to and account for technical issues in domestic policies, while other meeting participants can inquire, discuss, or consult on relevant matters. Public participation will thus enhance the input legitimacy of the TBT and SPS, creating the environment of responsiveness and accountability, as argued by Orden and Roberts (2007) TBT Agreement, supra note 54, Annex 3(b): "This Code is open to acceptance by any standardizing body within the territory of a Member of the WTO, whether a central government body, a local government body, or a non-governmental body; to any governmental regional standardizing body one or more members of which are Members of the WTO; and to any non-governmental regional standardizing body one or more members of which are situated within the territory of a Member of the WTO (referred to in this Code collectively as "standardizing bodies" and individually as "the standardizing body.").
Yoshiko Naiki, Accountability and legitimacy in global health and safety governance: the world trade organization, the SPS committee, and international standard-setting organizations, 43 J. WORLD TRADE 1255 , 1279 (2009 
GATS's transparency: A reform model enshrined
As previously noted, transparency provisions embedded in GATT are more specific than those of the GATS, particularly with respect to requirements for promptly publishing "in such a manner as to enable governments and traders to become acquainted with them." 86 Also, the GATS provides weaker transparency requirements than the SPS-TBT Agreements, defining a "reasonable interval" 87 as going from the publication of the regulation until its date of effectiveness. 88 Article VI:2 of the GATS does borrow some ideas and concepts from Article X of GATT. For example, it mandates that "all measures of general application affecting trade in services must be administered in a reasonable, objective, and uniform manner" and "prompt review" by "judicial, arbitral, or administration tribunals" is necessary for administrative decisions affecting trade in services. 89 Strikingly, however, while the GATT does not use the term "transparency" in Article X (or in the text of the whole Agreement), the GATS conspicuously invokes the term "transparency" in its preamble when it references: "[w]ishing to establish a multilateral framework This requirement of transparency is undoubtedly an object and purpose of the GATS -and the WTO in general -and applies equally to GATS schedules of specific commitments. Indeed, schedules of specific commitments determine, inter alia, the scope of market access and national treatment obligations that Members undertake under the GATS.
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Cottier observes that progressive liberalization has never been an easy process; rather, it is indeed a long-term solution for balancing diversified policy, administrative regimes, political interests, and so on, for "information on any of its measures of general application" and establishing at least one "enquiry point to provide specific information" are two obligations that can also be found in the TBT and SPS Agreements, but less comprehensively. GATS, supra note 53. According to Article III bis, disclosure of confidential information is described as "the disclosure of which would impede law enforcement, or otherwise be contrary to the public interest, or which would prejudice legitimate commercial interests of particular enterprises, public or private." Article XIV bis relates to information that would be contrary to essential security interests.
96 Id. at art. III:3.
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Panagiotis Delimatsis argues that notification obligations in SPS and TBT Agreements are more specific and comprehensive than those of the GATS, relating to special notification procedure (Article 2.9 TBT and Annex B. Intentionally, Article III:4 regulates the notification obligations for Member states only, and the right to access information therein is provided for Members, as a government-to-government relation, not one of private service suppliers, traders, investors, or other individual actors. 98 Consequently, private parties have to contact to their governments to access information relating to other countries where they want to invest or trade. In order to facilitate this access procedure, states need to build a legal framework for accessing information held by the government, like an FOIA. In this way, GATS notification requirements clearly stimulate domestic institutional reform toward openness without directly imposing administrative costs on
Members. Mattoo and Sauvé consider national transparency a global public good promoted by international organizations (IOs), but they have observed the need to balance openness with cost:
More generally, national transparency may be a global public good the full benefits of which are not fully internalized by each national government. In any case, if multilateral rules do create deeper transparency obligations, there must be some way of ensuring that these rules do not place an excessively costly administrative burden, especially on poorer countries.
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As indicated by its title of "Domestic Regulation," Article VI is clearly aimed at reducing discrimination in trade and services and harnessing domestic administrative regulation by applying the principles of due process and good governance to the GATS through different measures. It explicitly attempts to facilitate market access among Members, and implicitly fosters domestic administrative reform. Each Member is thereby obligated to enhance its legal infrastructure to different degrees in proportion to its own level of development, thus speeding up the process of progressive liberalization. 100 Delimatsis has explained the differential treatment accorded to developing countries and LDCs as follows:
In particular, the creation of horizontal disciplines on necessity and transparency, and depending on the limitations expressed thereunder (e.g. the application of the future disciplines only in scheduled sectors, the extent of best-endeavour provisions, the establishment of long transitional periods for implementation by developing countries, or LDCs, etc.), is expected to mitigate the trade-distorting effects of domestic regulations in the services realm.
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Overall, the foundation for administrative reform enshrined in Article VI of GATS was established to encompass a system of legally binding provisions-a framework for the development of licensing, qualifications, and technical standards-for the present and the future. The first three paragraphs of Article VI, as Delimatsis points out in his article, 102 identify the criteria of due process originating from the common law system and introduce the procedural legitimacy to the domestic administration of each Member. substantive content of domestic regulations of general application but rather to their administration and how they are applied." This obligation is also limited to sectors where specific commitments are undertaken.
-Article VI:2 refers to independent judicial, arbitral, or administrative tribunals or procedures for the prompt review of, or appropriate remedies for, administrative decisions relating to trade in services.
If the requirements for independent judicial review cannot be implemented, then Members must ensure their impartiality and the objectivity of the reviewing procedure. Clearly, this provision sets up minimum criteria for procedural fairness with independent judicial (or arbitral or administrative tribunal) capacities in national jurisdictions. However, this provision can be considered an orientation rather than an official mandate, since states are entitled to determine the appropriate institutional structures for the review mechanism. Consequently, developing states are not required to initiate such tribunals or procedures if they would conflict with the state's domestic constitutional structure or the nature of its legal system. The ideal of progressive liberalization is for states to first adjust or amend their constitutional and legal systems to fully comply with these requirements and be considered a trustworthy player. These adjustments will then lead to overall legal reform. multilateral negotiations with a view to liberalizing their services markets incrementally, rather than immediately and completely at the time of the acceptance of the GATS.
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Reforming domestic regulation is a complicated task that cannot be accomplished in the near future.
This will be a long process of regulatory reform to eradicate (or diminish) technical barriers to trade and increase awareness of Members of the importance of trade liberalization. Due process, including necessity and transparency, is considered a reflection of efficiency and effectiveness stemming from progressive liberalization. 108 Trade liberalization will improve economic performance, especially in developing countries. They will have to eliminate barriers to trade through WTO pressure via horizontal disciplines on necessity and transparency introduced in Article VI of the GATS. GATS rules have paved the way for administrative reform at national level to cultivate comprehensive market access among state Members.
The WTO has a unique role as a flagship of global governance that forms global administrative law.
Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart argue that global administrative law helps ensure the accountability of global administration. 109 Transparency and participation are the most important elements for an effective administrative procedure in both the domestic and international spheres. An ambitious model of reform that the GATS introduced to WTO Members was undeniably based on this theory.
Trade policy review mechanism: Counter-surveillance device for "cleaning up"
In the Marrakesh Agreement (Annex III(a)), the founding Members of the WTO agreed to establish the TPRM aiming to
[c]ontribute to improved adherence by all Members to rules, disciplines and commitments made under the Multilateral Trade Agreements and, where applicable, the Plurilateral Trade Agreements, and hence to the smoother functioning of the multilateral trading system, by achieving greater transparency in, and understanding of, the trade policies and practices of Members. 110 The TPRM, in simple parlance, is an important mechanism for monitoring transparency. However, it does not impose equal obligations on all Members. The trade policies of major players (the Quad) of the enforcement of specific obligations under the Agreements or for dispute settlement procedures, or to impose new policy commitments on Members." 112 This process can be schematized as follows:
Questions that commonly need to be answered by states under review are related to what the state has done so far to make domestic regulations more transparent and promote due process and evenhandedness, and how timely the state's responsiveness to public comments has been. 114 In review meetings, states under review have to respond to and account for the objectives set forth in paragraph A, through which better governance and transparency are likely to be achieved. In its 2010 annual report, the TPRB noted:
The reviews have helped to enhance understanding in these countries of the WTO Agreements, enabling better compliance and integration in the multilateral trading system; in some cases, better interaction between government agencies has been facilitated by the reviews. The reports' wide coverage of Members' policies also enables Members to identify any shortcomings in policy, and specific areas where further technical assistance may be required.
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(1) Similarly, Francois believes that an effective TPRM can bring positive outcomes to developing countries, such as enhanced market access and improved credibility for their domestic policies and institutional reforms. 116 For developing countries, the TPRM helps promote institutional transparency, thus stimulating political pressure for legal reform toward liberalization. Moreover, national credibility and regulatory rationality will also be consolidated. It is worth noting that the TPRM mutually utilized internal and external resources for its reviews. Zahrnt argues that the TPRM strives to shape domestic politics without interfering in domestic jurisdiction. According to Zahrnt, the TPRM has three potential functions:
(1) Facilitating negotiations: The legitimacy of trade negotiations will likely be enhanced by "reducing the informational disadvantage of small and developing countries."
(2) Focusing international attention: Governments tend to become more liberal in trade policies in order to attract praise and avoid criticism.
(3) Influencing domestic politics: Counter-surveillance results in counter-learning, thus leading to more liberal policies, which in turn increase liberal stakeholders in the country under review.
Ultimately, domestic liberal reform will result.
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Clearly, changes in domestic regulatory practice have not stemmed from direct external intervention, horizontally or vertically. Rather, regulatory changes or reforms resulting from TPRM serve as a countersurveillance device that pushes states to protect their reputations from being criticized for their lack of regulatory transparency, predictability, evenhandedness, or due process. Through the pressure imposed by the TPRM, states under review may be cleaned up, become more transparent, and adopt practices of good governance. Aaronson and Abouharb simply describe how this process works as follows:
No member state can use this process to force changes to another states policies, but they can use the review to name and shame countries that fail to meet their obligations for transparency, participatory governance and due process.
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Moreover, in order to promote proactive disclosure, Members must regularly report their trade policy practices in reponse to the concerns of various parties, using an agreed-upon format determined by the TPRB. 119 Members also have to provide brief reports summarizing any significant changes to their trade policy between reviews. The Secretariat takes responsibility for technical assistance to developing positively impact domestic institutional change by consolidating the legal framework for multilateral trading, and stimulating the participation of the LDCs and developing countries in an international trading system.
Admittedly, the developed world expects the WTO to play a more active role in cleaning up the Third World in the common playground, particularly the "newbies" of multilateral trade. This raises the question of the extent to which the institutional and regulatory environment of countries under review can become more transparent or better governed, a continuing subject of fierce scientific debate.
However, anyone who believes that WTO transparency norms guarantee complete, timely, and universal eradication of corruption and cultivation of good governance for all weak Member states will likely be frustrated. This must be a long-term process, slow but progressive, as economist Cosbey (2007) affirms:
Using the TPRM to strengthen that process is not a grand scheme for improving the world, and it will not get the WTO or trade policy generally off the hook for demands to be more open and responsive to civil society concerns, but it is a small step the WTO can take, one consistent with its principles and practices that would contribute to the achievement of sustainable development.
121
Conclusion: The WTO transparency-norms for global administrative law
The Western countries, led by the U.S. and the EU, have successfully shaped the WTO legal framework despite the equal-voting rule for all Members. Among other developments, transparency norms have been transmitted to the WTO, and in turn, to developing countries. Through this process, the principles and norms offered by the WTO, including transparency, participation, and due process, have shaped the framework for global governance by compulsory power and institutional power. From
Article X of GATT 1947 to GATT 1994, the requirements for transparency, uniformity, and impartiality have been intended to cultivate the rule of law as modeled by U.S. administrative law. Analogously, the transparency provisions in the Annex 1A Agreements are aimed at promoting publication, responsiveness, and accountability under the tactics of the "notification obligations," "enquiry points,"
and "Code of Good practice" embodied in the SPS and TBT Agreements. More generally, but less specifically, transparency requirements in the GATS have the ambitious goal of establishing the model of reform for domestic administration enshrined in Articles III-VI. For monitoring and surveillance, the WTO TPRM is a process to evaluate the system of individual Members' trade policies and their influence on the multilateral trading system, thus serving as an instrument of counter-surveillance to reform bad governments and help states build trust within the international sphere. Admittedly, even though the degree to which states absorb these administrative law norms varies depending on their domestic political and institutional circumstances, the WTO has successfully and effectively established a foundation for global governance upon which transparency norms, among others, will help promote administrative legal reform among state Members.
Transformative, regulatory transparency and the right to access information are bedrocks for the participation and accountability associated with democratic control and oversight. Therefore, global governance, from optimistic and constructivist perspectives, provides opportunities for states to improve the rule of law, develop sustainable institutions, and promote democracy. In the WTO environment, transparency norms have become powerful in addressing governance and institutional problems such as maladministration, lack of the rule of law, and ungoverned bureaucratic discretion.
